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V. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
J.A. Croson Co. v. City of Richmond: Nonfederal
Government Entities May Use Racial Classifications Only to
Remedy Prior Government Discrimination
The fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution prohibits states
from denying any person the equal protection of the laws.' The United
States Supreme Court has found that racial classifications have denied
members of minority groups the equal protection of the laws. 2 To overcome
the effects of prior discrimination that has deprived minorities of the equal
protection of the laws, public and private entities voluntarily have imple-
mented affirmative action programs.' Affirmative action programs, however,
often grant preferences to minorities that impair the competitive position
of nonminorities.4 Courts, therefore, have interpreted the equal protection
clause to require that racial preferences in affirmative action programs serve
a remedial purpose.' To comport with the equal protection clause, an
1. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
2. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493-95 (1954) (rejecting, in context of
public education, application of separate but equal doctrine). Prior to Brown v. Board of
Educ., courts approved of policies and laws segregating members of different races, provided
that affected persons received substantially equal facilities. Id. at 488. In Brown, however, the
Supreme Court rejected the notion that separate educational facilities could be substantially
equal. Id. at 494-95.
3. See, e.g., United Steel Workers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 197 0979) (setting aside for
minority participation one-half of private employer's positions in craft training program);
Associated Gen. Contractors v. Metropolitan Dade County, Fla., 723 F.2d 846, 849 (lth Cir.)
(setting aside percentage of county construction project for exclusive bidding by minority
firms), cert. denied 469 U.S. 871 (1984); Ohio Contractors Assoc. v. Keip, 713 F.2d 167, 169
(6th Cir. 1983) (requiring prime contractors to set aside percentage of contracts that stite
entered for exclusive bidding by minority firms); Detroit Police Officers' Assoc. v. Young,
608 F.2d 671, 681 (6th Cir. 1979) (accelerating eligibility of black patrolmen for promotion to
sergeant ahead of eligibility of white patrolmen for promotion), cert. denied 452 U.S. 938
(1981).
4. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 270-71 (1986) (plurality opinion)
(describing collective bargaining agreement that provided for school district to lay off non-
minority teachers with greater seniority than minority teachers whom school district retained);
Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 514 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring) (acknowledging that
10% set aside placed burden on nonminority contractors); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke,
438 U.S. 265, 289 (1977) (opinion of Powell, J.)(stating that medical school admissions
precluded white applicants from competing for 16 of 100 positions for entering class).
5. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 274 (1986) (plurality opinion)
(stating that court must determine whether race-based action serves to remedy prior discrimi-
nation); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 480 (1980) (plurality opinion) (acknowledging
Congress' power to use racial preferences to remedy prior discrimination); Regents of Univ.
of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 301-02 (1977) (opinion of Powell, J.) (discussing racial
preferences as judicially imposed remedies for prior discrimination); Associated Gen. Contrac-
tors, Inc. v. City of San Francisco, 813 F.2d 922, 930 (9th Cir. 1986) (limiting use of racial
preferences by local government to remedying governmental discrimination); J. Edinger & Son,
Inc. v. City of Louisville, Ky., 802 F.2d 213, 216 (6th Cir. 1987) (requiring proof of prior
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affirmative action program must fulfill two requirements. 6 The Supreme
Court requires, first, that a public .entity support an affirmative action
program with a finding of prior discrimination. 7 The Supreme Court re-
quires, second, that a public entity limit the scope of racial preferences to
remedying the effects of prior discrimination.8 In J.A. Croson Co. v. City
of Richmond,9 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
recently considered whether a Richmond city ordinance that set aside thirty
percent of the dollar amount of city construction contracts for minority
owned subcontracting firms violated the equal protection clause.' 0
In Croson the Richmond City Council (Council) adopted the Minority
Business Utilization Plan (Richmond Plan) after a public hearing." The
Richmond Plan required contractors who wished to bid on Richmond
construction contracts to subcontract thirty percent of the dollar amount
of all construction contracts to minority business enterprises (MBE's).' 2 To
discrimination to justify use of racial preference); Associated Gen. Contractors v. Metropolitan
Dade County, Fla. 723 F.2d 846, 851-52 (11th Cir. 1984) (requiring that racial preference serve
to remedy prior discrimination).
6. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 274 (plurality opinion); id. at 284-85 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
In Wygant the United States Supreme Court recognized that the strict scrutiny standard of
review requires a public entity to show that the challenged action pursues an objective that a
compelling governmental interest justifies and that the effect of the challenged action does not
exceed the compelling governmental interest. Id. at 274 (plurality opinion); id. at 284-85
(O'Connor, J., concurring). But cf. id. at 301-02 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (stating that racial
classifications that substantially are related to achieving important governmental objectives
satisfy strict scrutiny review).
7. Id. at 277 (plurality opinion); see id. at 292 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating that
public entity must have firm basis to conclude that affirmative action is appropriate). The
Supreme Court in Wygant noted that unless a public entity provides findings to show that the
public entity previously discriminated against a minority group, courts cannot ascertain whether
a racial classification serves a remedial objective. Id. at 277-78 (plurality opinion). Before the
Supreme Court decided Wygant, courts had permitted public entities to implement racial
preferences upon findings which showed that unidentified parties had discriminated against
minorities. See Fuiflove, 448 U.S. at 477-78 (permitting Congress to use racial preference to
prevent perpetuation of effects of prior general discrimination); Associated Gen. Contractors,
Inc. v. Metropolitan Dade County, Fla., 723 F.2d 846, 853 (11th Cir. 1984) (stating that
findings of discrimination not traceable to county actions justified county's adoption of racial
preference).
8. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 279-80 (plurality opinion).
9. 822 F.2d 1355 (4th Cir. 1987).
10. J.A. Croson Co. v. City of Richmond, 822 F.2d 1355, 1356 (4th Cir. 1987).
11. Id. at 1362-63 (Sprouse, J., dissenting). In Croson the Council heard public statements
responding to the proposed Richmond Plan at a public hearing held on April 11, 1983. Id.
At the hearing, five representatives from contractors' and estimators' associations made
statements opposing the Richmond Plan. Id. at 1363 n. 6. Four community members, however,
spoke in favor of the Richmond Plan.' Id. After hearing testimony, the Council discussed a
nationwide background of remedial programs and heard assertions that discrimination existed
in Richmond's public contracting. Id. at 1363 & n. 7. The Council also reviewed statistics
showing that although MBE's received less than one percent of the dollar amount of city
contracting in a five-year period, minorities comprised fifty percent of the Richmond popu-
lation. Id. at 1363.
12. Id. at 1356.
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enforce the MBE requirement, the Richmond Plan required all bidders on
city construction contracts to submit with the contract bids a UP-1 form
to the Richmond Department of General Services (General Services). 3
General Services would deem contractors who failed to submit the UP-1
form within ten days after the bid opening date to be in noncompliance
with the Richmond Plan.14 If General Services found that no other bidder
for the contract could comply with the MBE requirement, however, General
Services could approve a waiver of the MBE requirement. 5 For General
Services to grant a waiver, the Richmond Plan required a contractor who
could not comply with the MBE requirement to submit a request for waiver
within ten days after the date on which Richmond opened the bids.' 6
On September 30, 1983, J.A. Croson Company (Croson) received an
invitation to bid on a contract to install new sanitary fixtures in the
Richmond city jail.17 To comply with the Richmond Plan, Croson attempted
to locate an MBE, but failed to find an MBE to participate in the contract.',
On October 12 Croson submitted a bid to General Services. 9 On October
13 Richmond officials opened the sealed bids and found that the Croson
bid included a non-MBE quote for the plumbing fixtures.20 On October 19
13. Richmond, Va., Ordinance No. 83-69-59 (April I1, 1983) (revised July 12, 1983). In
Croson the Richmond Plan required the bidder to list on the UP-i form the names of MBE's
that the prime contractor intended to employ and the ownership percentage of those MBE's.
Id. The Richmond Plan also required the prime contractor to state on the UP-I form the
dollar amount and percentage of the contract awarded to each MBE. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. In Croson, to justify a waiver of the MBE requirement, the Richmond Plan
required a contractor to show that the contractor had made every feasible attempt to comply
with the MBE requirement and that sufficient, relevant, qualified MBE's to meet the thirty
percent set aside were unavailable or unwilling to participate. Id. The Richmond Plan also
required the waiver request to indicate the efforts that the contractor had made to locate an
MBE, the names of firms and organizations that the contractor had contacted, and the reasons
why MBE's had declined. Id.
17. J.A. Croson Co. v. City of Richmond, 779 F.2d 181, 183 (4th Cir. 1985), vacated,
106 S. Ct. 3327 0986).
18. Id. In Croson Croson's regional manager in Richmond, Eugene Bonn, determined
that Croson could meet the MBE requirement for the Richmond city jail project only by
subcontracting the supply of the plumbing fixtures to an MBE. Id. Bonn telephoned five or
six MBE's on September 30 to obtain price quotes on the fixtures. Id. Bonn claimed also to
have contacted Continental Metal Hose (Continental), the only MBE located in Richmond, on
September 30. Id. Melvin Brown, the president of Continental, claimed Bonn did not contact
Continental until October 12. Id. On October 12, Bonn again contacted several MBE's,
including Continental. Id. Brown subsequently informed Bonn that Continental wished to
participate in the project. Id.
Continental contacted two suppliers of the fixtures needed for the project, but failed to
obtain any price quotes. Id. One supplier refused to quote to Continental because the supplier
already had provided a quote to Croson. Id. The other supplier refused to quote to Continental
until Continental underwent a credit check, which would take thirty days. Id. Continental
relayed these problems to Bonn on October 13. Id. At that time, Bonn encouraged Continental
to continue to seek a supplier for the plumbing fixtures. Id.
19. Id.
20. See id. (noting that Croson submitted only bid on Richmond city jail project).
19881
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Croson submitted to General Services a request for waiver of the MBE
requirement. 21 Richmond later informed Croson that because Continental
Metal Hose (Continental), an MBE, could quote on construction materials
for the project, Richmond had withheld approval of the request for waiver."
Croson, consequently, submitted a second waiver request and sought to
raise the contract price by $7,663.16 to cover the added expense of awarding
the subcontract to Continental.23 Richmond, however, refused to raise the
contract price and denied the second request for waiver. 24 On November 18
Richmond informed Croson of Richmond's intent to rebid the Richmond
city jail project and invited Croson to submit a new bid.
25
Croson, consequently, filed suit in the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Virginia. 26 Croson alleged, among other things, that
the MBE requirement of the Richmond Plan violated the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment. 27 The district court, However, upheld
the Richmond Plan.3 Croson unsuccessfully appealed the district court's
decision to the Fourth Circuit. 29 The Supreme Court, however, vacated the
21. Id. In Croson the request for waiver of the MBE requirement characterized Conti-
nental as unqualified and stated that other MBE's were nonresponsive or unable to quote a
price for the plumbing fixtures. Id.
22. Id. In Croson Continental on October 27 contacted another plumbing fixture supplier
who was willing to quote on the fixtures to Continental. Id. On the same day, Continental
informed General Services that Continental could provide the fixtures. Id. Richmond, subse-
quently, informed Croson that the Human Relations Commission withheld approval of Croson's
request for waiver of the MBE requirement. Id. At that time, Richmond gave Croson ten
days to submit a UP-1 form complying with the set aside provision and warned that if Croson
did not submit a UP-I form demonstrating compliance, Richmond would consider Croson's
bid nonresponsive. Id. at 183-84.
23. Id. at 184.
24. Id.
25. Id. In Croson Croson requested General Services to review Richmond's decision to
rebid the project. Id. General Services denied review of Richmond's decision to rebid the
project because the Richmond City Code only provided review of decisions to award a contract
to another party, and not of decisions to rebid a project. Id. at 184 & n. 5.
26. Id. In Croson Croson initially filed suit in the Circuit Court of the City of Richmond.
Id. at 182, n. 1. The suit subsequently was removed to the District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia. Id.
27. Id. at 184.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 183-94. On appeal to the Fourth Circuit in Croson, Croson argued that
Richmond had no power to enact the Richmond Plan under Virginia state law, that the
Richmond Plan was contrary to Virginia public policy, that the Richmond Plan violated Art.
I, § 11 of the Virginia Constitution, and that the Richmond Plan violated the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 184. The Fourth Circuit found, however, that
because the Richmond Plan would increase the future number of subcontractors available and,
consequently, facilitate competitive principles, Virginia law permitted the Council to enact the
Richmond Plan. Id. at 185. Treating the equal protection provision in the Virginia Constitution
as equivalent to the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, the Fourth Circuit
also found that the Council made adequate findings to support the constitutionality of the
Richmond Plan. Id. at 188-90. The Fourth Circuit noted that the Council determined that the
Richmond record of contracting with MBE's was part of a national problem. Id. at 189. The
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Fourth Circuit's decision and remanded the case to the Fourth Circuit ° for
reconsideration in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Wygant v.
Jackson Board of Education.3
On remand, the Fourth Circuit held that the MBE requirement violated
the equal protection clause.3 2 The Fourth Circuit recognized that to withstand
constitutional attack, racial preferences must serve a compelling govern-
mental interest. 3 The Croson court noted that findings of prior societal
discrimination do not demonstrate a compelling governmental interest.14 The
Fourth Circuit required, instead, that to show a compelling governmental
interest, findings must show that the governmental unit that has adopted a
racial preference previously discriminated against the group that a racial
preference will benefit.3s The Croson court found that the Council relied
upon statistics that did not show prior discrimination by the appropriate
governmental unit.36 The Fourth Circuit concluded, therefore, that the
factual basis on which the Council relied did not demonstrate a compelling
governmental interest to remedy the effects of prior discrimination. 1 The
Fourth Circuit found, further, that the Council's record supporting the
Richmond Plan was inadequate.3" The Croson court stated, however, that
the Council did not need to engage in the extensive factfinding that a
federal district court would undertake.
39
Fourth Circuit found, further, that the statistical disparity between the minority population in
Richmond and the percentage of contracting awarded to MBE's supported the Council's
determination that Richmond shared in the national problems faced by MBE contractors. Id.
at 190.
30. J.A. Croson Co. v. City of Richmond, 106 S. Ct. 3327 (1986) (mem.).
31. 106 S. Ct. 1342 (1986); see also infra notes 45-52 and accompanying text (discussing
Wygant).
32. J.A. Croson Co. v. City of Richmond, 822 F.2d 1355, 1357 (4th Cir. 1987).
33. Id.
34. Id. at 1358.
35. Id.
36. See id. at 1359 (stating that statistics should compare percentage of available minority
contractors to percentage of contracting dollars awarded to minority contractors). In Croson
the Fourth Circuit concluded that statements made at the Council hearing were too general to
support an inference that Richmond formerly had discriminated against minority contractors.
Id. at 1358. The Croson court noted, also, that the Council never heard any allegation that
Richmond previously had passed over minority firms submitting low bids. Id. at 1359. The
Fourth Circuit stated, further, that the Council's reliance on general population statistics
suggested that the Council enacted the Richmond Plan for political reasons, rather than for
remedial purposes. Id. at 1358-59.
37. See id. at 1359 (stating that Council made no showing of prior discrimination). The
Croson court suggested that in the construction industry, a disparity between the dollar
percentage of contracts awarded to minority contractors and the percentage of minority
contractors available, taking into account the contractors' specialties and experience, might
show prior discrimination. Id.
38. Id. at 1360. Although the Fourth Circuit in Croson did not formulate a concise
standard to judge whether a given factual record showed a compelling governmental interest,
the Fourth Circuit compared the factual record on which the Council acted to the factual
records supporting other remedial programs employing racial preferences. Id. The Fourth
Circuit found that the Council's factual record was grossly deficient. Id.
39. Id.
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After determining that the Council did not rely on an adequate factual
basis, the Fourth Circuit ruled that the Council did not tailor the Richmond
Plan to remedial goals. 40 The Croson court found that the thirty percent
figure for the set asides was arbitrary and unnecessarily impeded the rights
of non-minorities.4 1 The Fourth Circuit decided, also, that because the
Richmond Plan classified as MBE's certain minority groups about which
the Council had made no findings of prior discrimination, the definition of
the term "MBE" in the Richmond Plan was overbroad. 42 The Fourth
Circuit found that although certain provisions of the Richmond Plan limited
intrusion on the rights of innocent parties, the provisions did not overcome
the Richmond Plan's deficiencies.
43
In holding that a finding of prior discrimination must support imple-
menting a racial preference and that a public entity must tailor the racial
preference to serve remedial purposes, the Fourth Circuit relied on the
reasoning of the United States Supreme Court in Wygant v. Jackson Board
of Education.4 In Wygant the Supreme Court considered whether a layoff
provision in a collective bargaining agreement between the Jackson Board
of Education (Board) and the Jackson Education Association violated the
equal protection clause 5.4 The collective bargaining agreement provided that
to retain a certain percentage of minority teachers, the Board would lay off
nonminority teachers who had greater seniority than minority teachers." A
plurality of the Supreme Court recognized that racial classifications are
inherently suspect and, consequently, trigger constitutional review under a
strict scrutiny standard. 47 Applying the strict scrutiny standard, the Wygant
plurality stated, first, that prior societal discrimination does not provide a
40. Id. at 1360.
41. Id. at 1360-61. The Croson court noted that subcontracting percentages might not
always present a single subcontract to meet the 30% figure. Id. The Fourth Circuit concluded,
therefore, that the Richmond Plan placed a greater burden on nonminority subcontractors
than the 30% figure indicated. Id. The subcontract at issue in Croson represented 75% of the
dollar amount of the contract. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. The Croson court stated that the Richmond Plan's limited duration of five years
and a provision for waiving the MBE requirement narrowed the Richmond Plan's scope. Id.
44. Id. at 1357-58; see Wygant v. Jackson Board of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 274 (refusing
to recognize a compelling governmental interest in remedying societal discrimination). The
Croson court relied on the plurality opinion in Wygant. Croson, 822 F.2d at 1357, n. 1. The
plurality opinion in Wygant garnered the votes of four justices. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 269. In
a separate opinion, Justice White concurred in the judgment of the Wygant plurality. Id. at
294-95; see infra notes 45-52 and accompanying text (discussing fully Wygant).
45. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 273. In Wygant the collective bargaining agreement provided
that unless a layoff based on seniority would raise the percentage of minorities laid off above
the percentage of minority teachers that the district employed at the time of the layoff, the
school district would lay off teachers according to seniority. Id. at 270-71. When the school
district laid off nonminority teachers instead of minority teachers with less seniority, the
nonminority teachers challenged the collective bargaining agreement on constitutional grounds.
Id. at 271.
46. Id. at 270-71.
47. Id. at 273-74.
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sufficient basis to demonstrate a compelling governmental interest in rem-
edying prior discrimination. 48 The Wygant plurality ruled, instead, that to
justify a racial preference, a public entity must show prior discrimination
by the governmental unit involved. 49 The plurality in Wygant suggested,
further, that to demonstrate prior discrimination, statistics should show a
disparity between the percentage of minorities that an employer has hired
and the percentage of minorities in the relevant labor market.5 0 The plurality
in Wygant found, second, that the layoff provision imposed upon nomi-
nority teachers an excessively heavy burden.s1 The Wygant plurality con-
cluded, therefore, that the Board did not tailor the layoff provision to
accomplishing constitutional goals.
52
The United States Supreme Court's requirement in Wygant that findings
show that a public entity previously had discriminated against minorities
differs from the analysis that the United States Supreme Court applied to
contracting set asides in Fullilove v. Klutznick.53 In Fulliove a three member
plurality of the Supreme Court rejected a constitutional challenge to federal
legislation that included an MBE set aside. 54 In the Public Works Employ-
ment Act of 1977 (PWEA) 51 Congress conditioned receipt of federal grants
on compliance with a provision setting aside ten percent of the construction
contracting funded by the federal grants for MBE's.5 6 Although Congress
compared the percentage of federal contracts that MBE's received to the
48. Id. at 274. The Wygant plurality found that societal discrimination was a concept
too amorphous to provide a basis for remedial action. Id. at 276.
49. Id. at 274. The Wygant plurality found that because the groups that the statistics
compared had no apparent relation to each other, the statistics did not support an inference
that the Board had discriminated against minorities. Id.
50. See id. at 275 (discussing Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299,
308 (1977)). In Hazelwood School District v. United States the Supreme Court ruled that
statistics should compare the minority percentage of the Hazelwood teaching staff to the
minority percentage of available teachers in the area. Hazelwood, 433 U.S. at 308. The
Hazelwood court recognized that statistics showed that although minorities comprised almost
six percent of the available teachers, minorities comprised less than two percent of the
Hazelwood teaching staff. Id. The Supreme Court found that the difference in the percentages
was substantial on its face. Id. at 308-09. The Hazelwood court remanded the case, however,
to allow the school district to rebut the statistical evidence at trial. Id. at 309.
51. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 283 (stating that layoffs constitute
serious disruption of worker's life).
52. Id. at 283-84. In Wygant the Supreme Court noted that the Board failed to explain
why the Board had classified as disadvantaged minorities groups about which the Board had
made no findings of prior discrimination. Id. at 284, n. 13.
53. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
54. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 459 (1980) (noting Congress' use of statistics
that compared percentage of federal contracts received by minority businesses to percentage
of minorities in population). In Fullilove the Supreme Court recognized that barriers to
competitive access to public contracting could cause lack of minority business participation in
public contracting. Id. at 478.
55. Public Works Employment Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-28, 91 Stat. 116 (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C §§ 6705-6708, 6710 (1977)).
56. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 453-54.
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percentage of minorities in the population,5 7 the Fullilove plurality held that
the PWEA did not violate the equal protection clause.58 The Fullilove
plurality explained that Congress could conclude that the low percentage of
government contracts that MBE's received could result from the existence
and maintenance of barriers that reduced MBE access to competitive bidding
on government contracts.5 9 The plurality in Fullilove recognized that even
if no person discriminated against MBE's, traditional procurement practices
could perpetuate the barriers to competitive access that MBE's facedA0 The
Fullilove plurality concluded, therefore, that the PWEA was a constitution-
ally valid exercise of Congress' spending power.61 In considering whether
Congress had tailored the PWEA narrowly to serve remedial objectives, the
Fullilove plurality found that the PWEA imposed a relatively light burden
upon nonminority firms.62 The plurality in Fullilove found, further, that
administrative provisions of the PWEA prevented the PWEA from unnec-
essarily impeding the rights of nonminorities.6
By requiring public entities to provide proper findings of discrimination
with adequate evidentiary support, the Wygant plurality departed from the
deferential standard of review that the Supreme Court applied in Fullilove
57. See id. at 459 (noting that sponsor of PWEA stated that although minorities
comprised between fifteen and eighteen percent of population in 1976, MBE's received less
than one percent of all federal procurement).
58. Id. at 490.
59. Id. at 478. In Fulliove the Supreme Court noted that Congress had heard reports
that in gaining access to government contracts, MBE's faced major difficulties unrelated to
intentional discrimination, including deficiencies in working capital, an inability to meet bonding
requirements, a competitive disadvantage due to lack of experience, an unawareness of bidding
opportunities, and an unfamiliarity with bidding procedures. Id. at 467.
60. Id. at 478.
61. Id. at 473. The Fulliove plurality found that Congress' authority under the Spending
Power provision of article one of the United States Constitution is at least as broad as
Congress' regulatory authority under the Commerce Clause of article one of the United States
Constitution. Id. at 475; see U.S. CoNsT. art. I § 8 cl. 1 (authorizing Congress to provide for
general welfare of United States). The Fullilove plurality concluded that under the Commerce
Clause, Congress constitutionally could enforce the PWEA against prime contractors. See
Fulliove, 448 U.S. at 476 (stating that as to prime contractors, Congress could have achieved
objectives of PWEA under Commerce Clause); see U.S. CoNsT. art. I § 8 cl. 3 (authorizing
Congress to regulate interstate commerce). The plurality in Fulilove concluded, further, that
§ 5 of the fourteenth amendment empowered Congress to enforce the PWEA against state
and local governments. See Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 478 (stating that as to state and local
grantees, Congress could have achieved objectives of PWEA under § 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment); see also U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV § 5 (empowering Congress to enforce provisions
of fourteenth amendment with specific legislation).
62. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 484. The Fullilove plurality compared the scope of the PWEA's
effect on available contracts to the overall amount of construction contracts available in the
United States. Id. at 484-85 & n. 72. The Fullilove plurality concluded that the PWEA's 10%
set aside accounted for only 0.25% of the annual expenditure on construction work in the
United States. Id.
63. See id. at 486-88 (discussing administrative provisions for determining whether
particular MBE is bona fide MBE and whether good faith efforts can locate MBE's to satisfy
10% set aside).
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to Congressional action." The Fourth Circuit in Croson properly applied
the reasoning of the Wygant plurality, rather than the reasoning of the
Fullilove plurality.65 Because state and local governments lack the consti-
tutional authority to remedy the lingering effects of prior discrimination
that Congress may exercise under the spending power, courts should require
state and local governments to make more specific findings of prior dis-
crimination than courts would require of Congress.6s Furthermore, political
pressure to adopt racial preferences may have greater influence on a local
government's decisionmaking than on Congress' legislative judgment.67 By
requiring a public entity to demonstrate that the public entity previously
had discriminated against a minority group, courts can prevent local gov-
ernments from adopting racial preferences to gain the political support of
minority groups.68 The greater danger of political abuse that is present at a
local level of government supports the requirement that local governments
make findings that the government entity specifically has discriminated
against minorities.69 The distinction between federal and nonfederal govern-
ment entities provides a solid basis for courts to require local governments
to satisfy the stringent findings requirement that the Wygant plurality
employed.70
In applying Wygant's requirement of sufficient findings, the Croson
court recognized that a public entity may base findings of prior discrimi-
64. See Associated Gen. Contractors, Inc. v. City and County of San Francisco, 813
F.2d 922, 930 (9th Cir. 1987) (acknowledging that although Congress may remedy prior societal
discrimination, Wygant plurality required local instrumentality of government to show that
instrumentality previously had discriminated against minorities).
65. See infra notes 66-70 and accompanying text (discussing possibility of abuse of racial
classifications at local level of government).
66. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 515-16 n. 14 (1980) (Powell, J. concurring).
Justice Powell noted in Fulliove that the degree of specificity in findings may vary with the
nature and authority of different governmental bodies. Id. Justice Powell remarked, further,
that Congress has greater remedial power than any other instrumentality of government. Id.
at 516-17.
67. See Associated Gen. Contractors, Inc. v. City and County of San Francisco, 813
F.2d 922, 929 (9th Cir. 1987) (stating that federal structure protects individual rights from
political interference); THE FEDERALIsT No. 10, at 22 (J. Madison) (2d ed. Johns Hopkins
Univ. Press 1966) (stating that likelihood of political pressure increases as number of individuals
comprising majority decreases).
68. See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 310 (1978) (stating that by
recognizing societal discrimination as sufficient basis for remedy, courts would allow institutions
to distribute privileges to any group that institution perceived as victim of discrimination);
J. A. Croson Co. v. City of Richmond, 822 F.2d 1355, 1357-58 (4th Cir. 1987) (stating that
if courts allow local governments to adopt racial preferences to remedy prior societal discrim-
ination, local governments may adopt racial preferences according to politics of race); Asso-
ciated General Contractors, 83 F.2d at 932 n. 17 (noting that beneficiaries of set asides in
county ordinance might outnumber nonbeneficiaries).
69. See Associated General Contractors, 813 F.2d at 930 (discussing likelihood that local
government may respond to political pressures unrelated to justice and general welfare).
70. See id. (stating that distinction between federal and nonfederal governments reconciled
different findings requirements that Supreme Court applied in Wygant and Fullilove).
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nation either on specific allegations of discrimination or proper statistics. 71
Because employers typically are reluctant to admit specific instances of prior
discrimination, 72 statistical findings are a necessary means for demonstrating
that the employer previously discriminated against minorities.7 3 To demon-
strate prior discrimination, statistics must show a disparity between the
number of minorities available for employment in the relevant labor market
and the number of minorities that the public entity has employed. 74 General
population statistics, however, may reflect inherent societal disparities un-
related to intentional discrimination. 7" For example, the percentage of mi-
norities available to apply for employment or bid for a contract with a
public entity may be significantly lower than the percentage of minorities
in the general population. 76 Because general population statistics may not
support an inference of prior discrimination, general population statistics
fail to demonstrate that a compelling government interest exists. 77 Because
the Council incorrectly used general population statistics to represent the
relevant labor market, the Fourth Circuit in Croson, therefore, correctly
held that the Council had failed to show that Richmond previously had
discriminated against minorities. 78
The Croson court required that a public entity demonstrate findings of
prior discrimination in an adequate record.79 Statistical evidence of prior
71. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 292 (1986) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (stating that disparity between percentage of minorities hired and percentage of
qualified minorities available may demonstrate prior discrimination); J. A. Croson Co. v. City
of Richmond, 822 F.2d 1355, 1358-59 (4th Cir. 1987) (discussing both statements made before
Council and statistics presented to Council); Fiss, A Theory of Fair Employment Laws, 38 U.
Cm. L. Rv. 235, 267 (1971) (stating that admission by decision maker may prove prior
discrimination).
72. See Fiss, supra note 71, at 267 (stating that social mores disapproving of discrimi-
natory conduct discourage employers from admitting prior discriminatory practices).
73. See Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 340 n. 20 (1977) (stating
that statistics frequently are only means of showing covert employment discrimination).
74. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 275 (1986) (plurality opinion); see
Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 308 (1977) (finding that comparison
of minority percentage of teachers on faculty to minority percentage of applicants available
in area supports inference of prior discrimination).
75. See J. Edinger & Son, Inc. v. City and County of Louisville, Ky., 802 F.2d 213,
216 (6th Cir. 1986) (stating that social, economic, personal, and demographic factors may
affect population statistics).
76. See J.A. Croson Co. v. City of Richmond, 822 F.2d 1355, 1358-59 (4th Cir. 1987)
(stating that although minority percentage of Richmond population was large, percentage of
minority-owned contractors was small).
77. See Wygant, 476 U.S. at 274 (requiring showing of prior discrimination by public
entity to justify racial preference); see also supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text (discussing
failure of population statistics to show prior discrimination). But cf. J. Edinger & Son, Inc.
v. City and County of Louisville, Ky., 802 F.2d 213, 215 (6th Cir. 1986) (indicating that if
general populace represents pool of available applicants, population statistics may show prior
discrimination).
78. See Croson, 822 F.2d at 1358-59 (discussing Council's reliance on general population
statistics); see also supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text (discussing impropriety of using
population statistics instead of statistics concerning relevant labor market).
79. J. A. Croson Co. v. City of Richmond, 822 F.2d 1355, 1360 (4th Cir. 1987).
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discrimination may form part of an evidentiary record that supports a public
entity's finding of prior discrimination. 0 An evidentiary record provides
courts with facts needed to determine whether a public entity appropriately
adopted a racial preference to remedy. prior discrimination.8 1 Because the
record that supported the Richmond Plan did not support an inference that
Richmond acted pursuant to a compelling governmental interest, 82 the
Croson court correctly concluded that the record supporting the Richmond
Plan was deficient.8 3 In Croson, the Fourth Circuit implied, further, that
the record of prior discrimination should include extensive investigations
into relevant, prior governmental practices." The Supreme Court in Wygant
indicated, however, that the factual record needs to show only that the
public entity had a firm basis to conclude that the public entity had
discriminated against minorities.
85
An evidentiary record that demonstrates that a public entity properly
has compiled statistics showing a pattern of prior discrimination may provide
a sufficient basis for a public entity to conclude that a public entity
previously has discriminated against minorities.8 6 By requiring public entities
to provide an extensive record of findings of prior discrimination, the
Croson court would discourage public entities from voluntarily adopting
affirmative action programs.Y An extensive factual record, furthermore,
may not increase the likelihood that a racial preference will survive a
80. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 292-93 (1986) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (indicating that evidence of disparity between percentage of minorities hired and
percentage of minorities available may form part of basis for enacting racial preference).
81. See id. at 277 (stating that when nonminority employees challenge remedial program,
evidentiary support for public entity's conclusion is crucial). The plurality in Wygant recognized
that nomninority employees who challenge a remedial program bear the burden of proving
that the remedial program is unconstitutional. Id.
82. See supra notes 72-77 (discussing failure of general population statistics to demonstrate
compelling governmental interest). The record that supported the Richmond Plan consisted
primarily of improper statistics. See Croson, 822 F.2d at 1359 (stating that testimony offered
at public hearing did not overcome deficiency of statistical evidence); supra note 11 (detailing
facts that Council developed at public hearing).
83. See Wygant, 476 U.S. 267, 277 (requiring public entity to justify adopting racial
preference with evidentiary support); Croson, 822 F.2d at 1360 (finding that record supporting
Richmond Plan was deficient); supra, notes 71-78 and accompanying text (discussing failure
of Council's record to support inference of prior discrimination).
84. See Croson, 822 F.2d at 1360 (discussing cases in which public entities had referred
to reports by Office of Civil Rights of Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, reports
of legislative task forces, and reports of legislative committees).
85. Wygant, 476 U.S. 267, 292 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
86. Id. In Wygant Justice O'Connor suggested that statistics that would be sufficient to
support a Title VII claim that a public entity previously had engaged in a pattern of
discrimination would provide a firm basis for remedial action. Id.; see Hazelwood School
Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 308-09 & n. 14 (discussing sufficient statistical showing
in Title VII claim).
87. See Wygant, 476 U.S. at 290 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating that disincentive
to voluntary compliance with civil rights obligations outweighed value that contemporaneous
findings of prior discrimination had as evidentiary safeguard).
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challenge under the equal protection clause.18 The content of an evidentiary
record, rather than the extent of the evidentiary record, determines whether
a racial preference will survive a constitutional challenge.8 9 In finding that
the Council's evidentiary record was deficient in comparison to more exten-
sive evidentiary records, the Croson court misconstrued the Supreme Court's
discussion in Wygant of the importance of an evidentiary recordP°
In addition .to providing a basis for judicial review of a public entity's
asserted purpose, an adequate factual record may aid courts in determining
whether a public entity sufficiently has tailored a racial preference to meet
Croson's requirement that the racial preference not unduly burden nonmi-
norities. 91 Because government bodies may adopt racial preferences only to
remedy prior discrimination, racial preferences must benefit only those
minorities against which a particular government body has discriminated. 92
A minority set aside program that includes in its definition of minorities
racial groups against which the government body has not discriminated fails
under strict scrutiny because the program has an effect broader than its
constitutional purpose. 93 Because the Richmond Plan included in the defi-
nition of the term "MBE" minority groups about which the Council had
made no findings, the Fourth Circuit correctly found that the definition of
the term "MBE" was unconstitutionally broad.9 4
88. See Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. City and County of San Francisco,
813 F.2d 922, 933 (9th Cir. 1987) (finding that extensive data that public entity had compiled
did not support inference of prior discrimination).' In Associated General Contractors San
Francisco relied on a 172-page report containing information about the procurement practices
of 56 departments of San Francisco's government. Id. at 931. The Ninth Circuit focused,
nevertheless, on statistics that San Francisco had prepared and found that the statistics did
not demonstrate that San Francisco previously had discriminated against minorities. See id. at
933 (stating that findings must rest on more accurate data than city had compiled).
89. See supra note 88 (illustrating how extensive factual record may fal to show prior
discrimination).
90. See supra notes 86-89 and accompanying text (discussing extent of evidentiary record
necessary to show prior discrimination).
91. See Croson, 822 F.2d at 1360-61 (discussing burden of Richmond Plan on nonmi-
norities); cf. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 280, n. 6 (stating that to determine whether classification
is unconstitutionally broad, courts determine whether classification fits asserted remedial
purposes); see also infra note 93 and accompanying text (illustrating how absence of specific
findings may render racial preferences unconstitutional).
92. See Wygant, 476 U.S. at 284, n. 13 (stating that definition of term "minority" that
included minority groups about which school district had made no findings was overinclusive);
Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 537 (1980) (Stevens, J. dissenting) (stating that history
of discrimination against black citizens did not justify classification of other minority groups
as disadvantaged).
93. See Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. City and County of San Francisco,
813 F.2d 922, 934 (9th Cir. 1987) (finding that definition of term "MBE" that included
minorities about which city offered no evidence of prior discrimination was unconstitutionally
broad).
94. See Croson, 822 F.2d at 1361 (finding that Richmond Plan contained unconstitu-
tionally broad defimition of term "minority"); see also supra notes 92-93 (discussing uncon-
stitutionality of overinclusive racial classifications).
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To be constitutional, a racial preference furthermore must not impose
an unnecessarily heavy burden upon nonminorities. 95 In ruling that the thirty
percent set aside was arbitrary, the Croson court suggests that to limit the
effect of a set aside to constitutional purposes, the Council should have
chosen a set aside figure that matched the percentage of MBE's available.
96
The percentage of MBE's available to participate in Richmond's contracting
is, however, an unnecessarily narrow measure of the permissible scope of a
set aside.97 The set aside figure in Croson represents not the ultimately
desired level of MBE participation, but, instead, the rate for attaining the
goal of increased minority participation in public contracting.98 To determine
whether racial preferences impose an unnecessarily heavy burden upon
nonminorities, courts have measured the impact of racial preferences in
terms of the percentage of available contracting from which set asides
exclude nonminority participation. 99 Because contracting available in the
Richmond area included, in addition to Richmond's public contracting,
privately financed projects, the actual impact of the thirty percent set aside
upon nonminority contractors is less than thirty percent.l t By departing
from the analysis &at measures the impact of a set aside upon nonminorities
in relation to the percentage of available contracting, the Croson court
overrepresents the burden that the set aside placed upon innocent nonmi-
nority contractors.' 0'
In holding that the Richmond Plan was unconstitutionally broad, the
Croson court recognizes that findings of prior discrimination are necessary
for courts to determine whether a public entity has limited the effect of a
racial preference upon nonminorities to remedying prior governmental dis-
95. See Wygant, 476 U.S. at 283 (stating that racially based layoff programs place
unconstitutionally heavy burden on innocent parties); cf. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 484 (noting
that burden which PVEA placed on nonminority construction firms was relatively light).
96. See Croson, 822 F.2d at 1360 (stating that 30% figure was not tied to showing that
minorities owned 30% of Richmond subcontracting firms).
97. See J. A. Croson Co. v. City of Richmond, 822 F.2d 1355, 1367 (4th Cir. 1987)
(Sprouse, J., dissenting) (stating that to encourage growth of number of MBE's, set aside
figure must exceed percentage of MBE's available).
98. Croson, 822 F.2d at 1367 n. 14 (Sprouse, J., dissenting); see also United States v.
Paradise, 107 S. Ct. 1053, 1071 (1987) (stating that 50% set aside represented rate at which
Alabama Department of Public Safety would reach ultimate goal of 25% minority participa-
tion). In Croson the Richmond Plan automatically would have expired five years after the
Council adopted the Richmond Plan. Croson, 779 F.2d at 183; cf. Associated General
Contractors, 813 F.2d at 924 (describing San Francisco ordinance that would not expire until
MBE's received 30% of San Francisco's contracts).
99. See infra note 100 (discussing courts' determinations of percentage of contracting
that set asides remove from nonminority participation).
100. Cf. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 484, n.72 (finding that 10% set aside in PWEA accounted
for only 0.25% of national volume of contracting); Associated Gen. Contractors, Inc. v.
Metropolitan Dade County, Fla., 723 F.2d 846, 855 (11th Cir. 1984) (finding that 100% set
aside of single county construction project represented less than one percent of county's annual
construction expenditures).
101. See supra note 100 and accompanying text (discussing impact of set asides measured
in relation to volume of available contracting).
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crimination. 0 2 Without specific findings of prior discrimination, courts
cannot ascertain whether a public entity actually has discriminated against
the beneficiaries of racial preferences. 03 In suggesting that public entities
must choose a set aside according to the number of minorities available in
the relevant labor market, however, the Fourth Circuit unnecessarily restricts
the authority of public entities to fashion remedial measures. 0 4 The number
of minority firms that are available in a specific labor market is crucial,
nevertheless, for determining whether statistics support an inference that a
public entity previously has discriminated against minority businesses. 05
Because racial preferences are a form of discrimination, public entities may
employ racial preferences only to remedy prior governmental discrimina-
tion.101 Statistical evidence must show, therefore, that the public entity
previously has discriminated against the beneficiaries of a racial preference. 0
7
By adhering to the rule that a local government may remedy only govern-
mental, and not societal, discrimination, the Fourth Circuit reduces the
possibility that local governments might adopt a discriminatory remedy in
the absence of any prior discrimination. 0
ANrntsw MiN-E
102. J.A. Croson Co. v. City of Richmond, 822 F.2d 1355, 1360-61 (4th Cir. 1987).
103. See supra notes 81, 91 (discussing judicial review of findings of discrimination).
104. See supra notes 91-94 and accompanying text (discussing Croson court's analysis of
burden imposed by 30% set aside).
105. See supra notes 72-76 and accompanying text (discussing statistics as basis to infer
public entity previously discriminated against minority groups).
106. See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text (discussing proper limitation of racial
preferences to remedy prior discrimination).
107. See supra notes 48-50, 74-77 (discussing Wygant's effect on statistical proof of prior
discrimination).
108. See supra notes 66-70 and accompanying text (discussing rationale for requiring more
stringent findings of local governments than of Congress).
